SEEMA ELIZABETH ISOY v. TAN SRI DAVID CHIU TAT-CHEONG

[2024] 5 MLRA 68
Federal Court, Putrajaya
Hasnah Mohammed Hashim, Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal, Nordin Hassan FCJJ
[Civil Appeal No: 02(f)-54-09-2023(W)]
Hasnah Mohammed Hashim, Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal, Nordin Hassan FCJJ

JUDGMENT

Nordin Hassan FCJ:

Introduction

[1] This is another defamation suit brought by an aggrieved party for this Court's determination. Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong, the respondent before this Court, was the plaintiff at the High Court and Seema Elizabeth Isoy, the appellant, was the defendant. After a full trial before the High Court, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed. However, the plaintiff succeeded in his appeal at the Court of Appeal where the decision of the High Court was set aside and the plaintiff's claim was allowed. The plaintiff was awarded damages of RM100,000.00. Hence, the present appeal.

[2] The appeal before us, essentially, centers on the effect of a half-truth statement in defamation law in Malaysia, particularly whether a half-truth statement constitutes a false statement. On 28 August 2023, upon the appellant's application for leave to appeal, this Court granted the following questions:

Question 1

Are Malaysian Courts jurisdictionally competent to rely on foreign common law as far as it relates to the doctrine of 'half-truth' in deciding whether a statement is defamatory or otherwise when the provision of s 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 prohibits this reliance in circumstances where local statutory provisions provide a remedy as decided in the case of Chong Chieng Jen v. Government of State of Sarawak [2019] 1 MLRA 515?

Question 2

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, would the provisions of:

(i) Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 sufficiently provides a basis for the defence of justification in a situation where the impugned statement is 'substantially true'? and/or

(ii) Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957 sufficiently provides a basis for the defence of fair comment in a situation where the impugned statement is based on true matters?

Question 3

If the second question is answered in the affirmative:

(i) Would a 'substantially true' statement mentioning criminal charges as having been instituted against a plaintiff in a defamation suit be protected by the provision of s 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 despite the absence of a mention that the plaintiff was eventually acquitted of those charges? and/ or

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